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Abstract
Description logics are valuable for modeling the conceptual structures of scientific and
engineering research because the underlying ontologies generally have a taxonomic core.
Such  structures  have  natural  representations  through  semantic  networks  that  mirror  the
underlying description logic graph-theoretic structures and are more comprehensible than
logical notations to those developing and studying the models. This article reports experience
in the development of visual language tools for description logics with the objective of
making research issues, past and present, more understandable.
1 Introduction
Scholarship may be conceptualized as the rational reconstruction of intuitive notions within
the conventions of a discipline. When scholarly disciplines examine their foundations the
outcome is generally a taxonomy based on logical definitions intended to capture the concepts
of the primary researchers and to clarify the differences underlying disagreements. The
development and analysis of such taxonomies can be helpful to active research communities
attempting to clarify their activities, and it is also significant in retrospect to historians
reconstructing the conceptual structures of those recognized as major contributors to the
growth  of  human  knowledge.  Description  logics  managed  through  visual  languages
isomorphic to the underlying graph-theoretic structures, and visually transformable through
well-defined deductive processes, offer an attractive technology to support both historic
studies and active research communities.
The work reported in this paper is a continuation of that on the use of knowledge acquisition
and representation tools to model the knowledge structures of scholarly communities [1].
These studies involved the use of the visual language [2] that allowed knowledge structures to
be expressed as semantic networks with well-defined semantics that were automatically
translated  into  data  structures  in  KRS  [3],  an  implementation  of  a  CLASSIC-like  [4]
description logic. Inferences in KRS were graphed automatically as additions to the semantic
network so that users could visualize both the inputs and outputs without translation into
logical formulae [5].
In recent years there have been major advances in description logic research that make it
realistic to use richer representations incorporating negation, disjunction and some aspects of
recursion [6]. This enables one to overcome of the artificiality of the knowledge structures
noted above that attempted to avoid such constructions, resulting in unnatural representations,
of lesser use as models meaningful to the relevant community.
This paper reports on recent developments that: extend the visual language to support richer
description logics with disjunction, negation and existential quantification; exemplifies the
process of transforming semantic networks in coming to understand them; discusses factoring
deduction into its intensional and extensional operations to support paraconsistent reasoning
[7]; and raises a number of issues for future research.2 Understanding an Ontology
I have used the term “understanding an ontology” in order to capture the notion that users
should be able to see the effects of variations in the ontology, some of which do not change its
meaning, others of which change it significantly in ways that can be readily understood, and
others of which are logical consequences that may require some degree of explanation if they
are to be understood.
A visual language representation of ontologies is useful to support those without great fluency
in symbolic logic in its textual representation. Shin [8] has demonstrated that diagrammatic
reasoning  can  provide  a  rigorous  foundation  for  logical  inference,  and  psychological
experiments show that non-technical users of a knowledge-based system find inference in a
visual language easier to understand [9].
2.1 Designing a visual language for description logics
The design criteria for the visual language have been:
1  The visual language should provide an alternative syntax to linear textual languages
but have standard logical semantics and be intertranslatable with textual languages.
2  The visual language should be simple to explain to users, both those with deep
understanding of symbolic logic and those with little understanding.
3  The visual language should correspond to the natural graph-theoretic representation of
description logics that is commonly used in describing operations on them and in
implementing computational inference [10].
4  As many as possible of the syntactic and inferential transformations of expressions in
the visual language should be formally specifiable as graph-theoretic operations.
5  The visual language should be usable both for the input of logical definitions and
assertions, and for the output of logical inferences.
6  The visual language should support modularity in the specification of ontologies such
that definitions/assertions may be specified in one document and used in others [11].
7  Subject to these requirements, the visual language should be similar to existing
languages for semantic networks.
2.2 Overview of the KNet visual language
KNet, the visual language used in this paper is implemented in a generic visual language
shell, RepNet [12], that supports a user-specified syntax for node types and connecting lines
and a user scriptable interface for translation to and from semantic networks in the visual
language enabling integration with web services such as KRS and RACER [13]. It is simple to
change the language to conform to existing practices, user preferences, or changing notions of
what is required. The examples given follow the conventions described in [2] and are similar
to those of other graphical interfaces for description logics such as RICE [14].
Concepts are represented by the concept name in an oval. Concepts are defined through the
property they encode [15] in the graph derived by tracing outgoing arrows from the concept,
terminating at concept nodes or terminal nodes. Concepts are used through incoming arrows,
and may be both defined and used in the same graph.
Base, or primitive, concepts are indicated by short horizontal markers in the concept oval that
indicate that there is some unspecified outgoing graph unique to the concept. This is a
sufficient explication (in Carnap/Quine terms [16]) for the logical properties of a primitive
concept. From a logical perspective, is does not matter in reasoning with the concept how the
unspecified graph is represented provided it is unique to the concept. However, in modeling
scientific reasoning, one has to take into account that each school of thought may haveadopted a differing, more specific representation of a particular primitive concept, making a
distinction without a difference that can be a source of confusion in the literature.
Roles, or relations, are represented by the role name without any surrounding shape.
Individuals,  or  singletons,  are  represented  by  the  individual  name  in  a  rectangle.  An
individual exhibits [15] a property derived from its outgoing arrows as for concepts, which
may be conceptualized as the concept encoding its current state.
A collective individual or set is represented by an extensional constraint, and possibly an
identifying name, in a rectangle with inset vertical lines at each end. The constraint is
specified through upper and lower cardinality and inclusion bounds on the collection as
detailed in [3] where it was shown that such bounds may be conceptualized as defining
generalized sets or mereological collections having well defined unions, intersections and
complements, and forming a subsumption lattice under inclusion ordering (I have not yet
found an elegant graphical representation of the bounds, and hence have left these defined in
textual form within the node). Sets are important in representing role fillers, co-reference and
inclusion constraints, and, when defined by comprehension, material implications or rules.
The notation for an individual may be regarded as a shorthand for a set with cardinality 1
(consistent with the Quine/Scott [17/18] extensional simplification of set theory that a={a}).
Thus there are basically only three types of nodes: concepts, roles and mereological sets. The
node type “∃” is provided as a shorthand for the cardinality constraint “≥1”.
Arrows between nodes derive their semantics from the types of the nodes they connect.
An arrow from concept A to concept B means that concept A is defined to be subsumed by
concept B. The equivalent graph-theoretic interpretation is that the arrow may be replaced by
copying the graph of outgoing arrows from concept B to concept A (including the unspecified
graph of a primitive concept).
An arrow from individual A to concept B means that A is asserted to be an instance of B and
again may be given a graph-theoretic interpretation as a copy operation.
An arrow from an individual A or a set A to a set B means that A is contained in B. This can
be used to specify co-reference and inclusion constraints. An arrow from a concept A to a set
B means that any individual comprehended by A is contained in B. This has the corollary that
a rule, or material implication, may be represented as a set with a incoming arrow from a
premise concept and an outgoing arrow to a conclusion concept.
Multiple arrows from a node are taken as specifying a conjunction of properties. This
convention necessitates the introduction of a special node, “∨”, specifying a disjunction, with
the convention that outgoing arrows from this specify a disjunction of properties. The graph-
theoretic interpretation is one of multiple alternative graphs each having one of the branches
of  the  disjunction,  and  disjunction  nodes  can  always  be  eliminated  by  such  expansion
resulting in multiple, alternative definitions of a disjunctive concept.
The conjunctive node type “∧” is also available to use after a “∨” to disambiguate multi-
branch outgoing graphs that are to be treated as a single term in the disjunction.
Negation  is  represented  through  an  arrow  with  a  cross  bar  having  the  graph-theoretic
interpretation that the graph at the end of the arrow must not occur. This gives rise to the
standard semantics for negation, including De Morgan’s laws linking conjunction, disjunction
and negation. A negation arrow from a concept to a set may be used to represent a rule with
exceptions [19].
An existential constraint is specified through a set with an arrow to a concept applying to the
individuals included in it.
If  a  graph  contains  a  conjunction/disjunction  of  two  identical  graphs  then  one  of  the
conjuncts/disjuncts may deleted.2.3 Models, satisfaction and subsumption
A concept definition is coherent, or consistent, if all the set bounds specified in it are
consistent and there is no conjunction in it of an arrow and a negation arrow pointing to the
same graph.
A model satisfying an ontology defined in the visual language is a collection of individuals
satisfying all the existential constraints such that their resulting states are coherent.
One ontology is extensionally subsumed by another if any model satisfying it also satisfies
the other. This definition gives rise to the standard denotational, extensional, model-theoretic
semantics for description logics, and may be used to show that the graph-theoretic operations
of the visual language conform with the standard extensional semantics of description logics.
We may also introduce the notion of intensional or structural subsumption as a sub-graph
relation, that one ontology is intensionally subsumed by another if that other ontology is a
sub-graph  of  it.  It  follows  immediately  that intensional subsumption implies extensional
subsumption, but not necessarily vice versa.
However, the definition of intensional subsumption needs strengthening. First, a semantic
network may be conceptualized as a meta-graph that specifies a set of equivalent graphs
derivable  from  it  by  expansion,  contraction  and  other  logical  operations.  One  ontology
intensionally subsumes another if its graph at any stage of expansion or contraction is a sub-
graph of the other at any stage of expansion or contraction. One could state this in terms of
full expansions to a canonical form but for computational purposes the definition given is
more useful, particularly since recursive definitions give rise to infinite graphs.
Second, the labels given to non-primitive concepts are arbitrary from a logical perspective, so
that any remapping of labels that preserves non-identity may be used in computing structural
subsumption. This corresponds to the notion that different terms are being used for the same
concept, and is important in the analysis of scientific definitions since it often happens that
different terminology has been used for essentially the same concept. Mapping primitives to
one another is a deeper operation since it would imply that their tacit definitions are the same,
and is also important to the process of finding explications of the primitives. A good example
is the way in which the application of biological evolutionary theory to processes in other
disciplines has led to the abstraction of the principles of variety generation and selective
filtering underlying a general process of ‘evolution.’
Third, the semantics of set constraints have not been specified in graphical form, but their
subsumption lattice is well-defined so that one needs to extend the notion of sub-graph to be
one in which a set matches another if it subsumes it.
3 Some Examples
In order to illustrate some of the issues, this section takes the following simple ontology from
The Description Logic Handbook [6, p.52] and shows how it may be manipulated in KNet.
Woman ≡  Person   Female (1)
Man ≡  Person   ¬Woman (2)
Mother ≡  Woman   ∃ has_Child.Person (3)
Father ≡  Man   ∃ has_Child.Person (4)
Parent ≡  Father   Mother (5)
Grandmother ≡  Mother   ∃ has_Child.Parent (6)
Mother_With_Many_Children ≡  Mother   ≥3 has_Child (7)
Mother_Without_Daughter ≡  Mother   ∀ has_Child.¬Woman (8)
Wife ≡  Woman   ∃ has_Husband.Man (9)
Figure 1 Simple ontology of family relationships [6, p.52]Fig.2 shows the ontology of Fig.1 represented as a semantic network in KNet.
Figure 2 Ontology of Figure 1 in KNet
Figure 3 is equivalent to Figure 2, and derived from it by expanding all defined constructs,
pushing negation to terminal nodes, and excising contradictory branches from disjunctions.
These are all transformations that a representation system will probably make in transforming
the  definitions  into  an  internal  normal  form,  and  they  are  also  of  help  to  the  user  in
understanding the ontology.
Figure 3 Expanded ontology of Figure 2Some problems with the ontology defined in Figure 2 are apparent in Figure 3. “Mother
Without Daughter” and “Mother With Many Children” are not defined as expected because
they encompass situations in which a child is not a person. The problem may be viewed as
arising from the definition of “Mother” that has “Person” after an existential quantifier, and it
could be avoided by moving “Person” back to be a universal quantifier of the “has Child”
role. However, this would have the consequence in recognizing a “Mother” that all her
children would have to be checked to be people when it is intended that only the existence of
one need be checked.
These problems are arising because the ontology of Figure 2 avoids the use of the natural
recursive definition that the “has Child” role of a person must be filled by a person. However,
this is an innocuous use of recursion since the concept “Person” is a primitive that can only be
asserted of an individual, not recognized as applying to it, and hence the recursive definition
acts only as a constraint that needs propagating through a graph up to its existing terminal
nodes, not expanded indefinitely beyond them.
Fig. 4 shows an alternative ontology with the recursive definition, and Fig. 5 shows that it
leads to the expected definitions after expansion.
Figure 4 Alternative ontology to Figure 1
Figure 5 Expanded ontology of Figure 4Fig. 5 looks somewhat cluttered with “Person” terminals, and the user might wish to limit the
expansion by specifying that those implicit in the recursive definition are not shown, in effect
that the “has Child” role of a person is implicitly filled by a person. Nine uses of “Person” can
be dropped in Fig. 5 while preserving its equivalence to Fig. 4.
The point of this discussion to illustrate how various transformations of a ontology may affect
the understanding of it, and need to be supported through decision logic inference and
graphical  interaction.  Users  need  to  be  able  to  move  back  and  forth  between  readily
understood equivalent representations, much as does the inference engine. It is interesting to
see  how  the  defined  subsumptions  in  Fig.4  are  clearly  visible  to  users  as  inferable
subsumptions in Fig. 5 through subgraph relationships. Users also need to be able to compare
the effects of changes that do affect meaning such as those between Fig.2 and Fig.4.
The situation becomes more complex as inferences are made that go beyond the restructuring
discussed so far, for example, if it is the A-Box that is being graphed and extensional case-by-
case reasoning has been applied or rules have fired. KRS graphs the results of such reasoning
as additions as to the original graph after “infer” nodes, but makes no attempt to “explain”
them. CLASSIC provides a form of explanation of terminological reasoning [20] and this
together with  more  recent developments [21,22]  suggest  approaches  which  it  would  be
interesting to implement as modules providing graphical output through semantic networks.
In  its  applications  to  presenting  output  from  clustering  algorithms,  KNet  provides  an
interactive interface whereby users can adjust what parts of a graph are shown by moving a
slider to change a threshold. It would be interesting to take output from an inference engine in
a proof markup language [23] and have a slider that moved through a linear representation of
the proof steps while showing the resulting inferences being graphed in the semantic network.
Figure 6 provides a simple example of the distinctions made in Aristotle’s mechanics that led
to problems that medieval scientists attempted to resolve with little progress until their
reconstruction by Galileo facilitated their explication by Newton [24]. The state of an object
was seen to be either one of rest or one of motion, and several states of motion were
distinguished. One that was well-grounded in experience but problematic in the development
of a unified science of motion, was the distinction between heavenly and local bodies. The
problems generated by this distinction without a difference were greatly exacerbated by
making circular, constant motion part of the definitional essence of heavenly motion, thus
requiring no explanation in terms of material conditionals or ‘laws of motion.’
Figure 6 Distinctions in medieval mechanics
Medieval scientists accepted the heavenly—local distinction and the lack of need to explain
the ‘perfection’ of heavenly motion, and focused on problems with the behavior of bodies in
free-fall motion, that they accelerated, and ones in ‘violent’ motion, such as projectiles, that
they continued in the direction in which they were projected even though they had lost contact
with the projector. This led to explanations in terms of notions such as impressed ‘impetus’
[24].Galileo dropped the distinction between heavenly and local bodies and between free fall and
violent motion, but introduced new problems through the notion that the earth itself was
moving and yet this had no apparent effect on objects in free fall. One can track the changing
ontologies and laws from Aristotle through Buridan and Oresme to Copernicus and Galileo
and hence to Descartes, Huygens, Hooke, Newton et al, as the gradual reduction of primitives
in the ontologies of motion and their replacement by the material implications which we now
know as Newton’s ‘laws of motion’ [24].
4 The Transition from Logical Opposition to Numeric Scales
One important phenomenon in the development of scientific reasoning is the way in which
qualitative  distinctions  become  refined  to  be  graded  distinctions,  eventually  becoming
numeric scales of observable measured with ever-increasing precision [25]. We can model
this process in a description logic by introducing the natural symmetry of an opposition, that it
is generally conceived as based on two opposing concepts of equal status rather than one and
its negation as in Figs. 2, 4 and 6. The resultant structure turns out to have the properties of a
multi-point scale.
Figure 7 From an opposition to a five-point scale
Fig. 7 exemplifies this process. The opposition between the primitives, rest and motion, is
modeled by the extremes of absolute rest and high-speed motion which inherit from one
concept and the negation of the other. This leads to a natural five-point scale as three other
concepts are interpolated between them, the two primitives and their disjunction. Seven and
nine-point scales may be developed from this by adding another concept such as ‘extreme
value.’ Once the logical possibility of grading the opposition has been realized it is natural to
look for quantities to measure that correlate with the scale and provide further gradations.
5 Supporting Paraconsistent Reasoning
In the literature on modeling scientific reasoning it has been argued that inconsistencies are
often present but do not cause “explosive” growth of conclusions through the ex  falso
quodlibet derivations of classical logic [7]. Hence it has been proposed that paraconsistent
logics are needed to account for scientific reasoning [26]. However, uniform paraconsistency
is not desirable since many major achievements in the scientific literature, such as Arrow’s
impossibility  theorem,  result  from  proofs  of  definitional  inconsistency,  and  Rips’
psychological studies show that people readily generate reductio ad absurdum arguments to
solve logic problems [27].
Batens has proposed and developed adaptive logics that default to classical behavior in the
absence of inconsistency, but behave paraconsistently in its presence [28]. Description logics
are well-suited to be foundations for such logics if the reasoning is factored appropriately. The
major example of ex falso quodlibet in description logics is that any incoherent definition is
subsumed by any other. However, structural subsumption based on graph-matching does not
lead to this conclusion. It has to be imposed separately. KRS [3] would happily report that aMeinongian  green,  round,  square entity, where round and square were declared disjoint
primitives, was subsumed by green, round  or  square but not by red,  provided  that  the
additional inference step of noting that the definition was incoherent and mapping it to bottom
was not taken.
Tableaux proofs by refutation obviously rely on such mapping but extensions to tableaux
methods have been described which support inconsistency-adaptive logics [29] and it would
be interesting to investigate how these might be incorporated in description logics.
A reasonable target architecture might be an inference engine with a user-interface through
semantic networks and control over the proof methods such that one can see the impact of
various methods in terms of the proofs generated and the inferences made. Normalization and
structural subsumption might provide a model of the inference patterns that have led to
incoherent definitions being accepted by scholarly communities for long periods of time, with
inferences being made despite the contradictions. Stronger proof methods might provide a
model of the anomaly detection that leads to a change in the conceptual framework marking a
minor or major “scientific revolution.”
6 Conclusions
Description logic technology, with visual language interfaces and control of proof techniques,
provides very valuable tools for understanding the knowledge processes of current and past
scholarly communities. Much of the current research on the support of the semantic web is
directly applicable since the sub-disciplines of science are known to form a “semantic web” of
inter-dependencies and provenances. It may be that some additional constructions will be
needed, but the advances of recent years in description logic research make it reasonable to
expect that it will be feasible to add them.
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